Salga Disciplinary Code Collective Agreement

Category : Uncategorized

[11] Once it has been established that the LRA can then apply to the LRA, any interpretation of the provisions of the LRA is an obligation to interpret it in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic. With regard to the exercise of the right to freedom of association, section 4, paragraph 1, point b) provides that a worker has the right to join a statutory union. Section 213 defines a union that designates a workers` association whose primary purpose is to regulate the relationship between workers and employers. In accordance with Section 8, point (a) (i), a union has the right to define its own constitution and rules. Section 23 gives effect and strength to collective agreements. The LRA provides for the creation of bargaining councils. Section 28, paragraph 1, points (a) and b), gives bargaining councils the power to enter into collective agreements and (b) to enforce those agreements. Subject to the provisions of section 32 and the provisions of the bargaining council, a collective agreement entered into by collective agreement binds the parties to the collective agreement who are also parties to the collective agreement. [34] First, the principle that freedom of association is interpreted as giving unions the right to recruit and represent members at least in the event of individual workplace claims is important. The first is closely linked to the principle of freedom of association enshrined in Section 18 of our Constitution, which is defined in the right to education and membership in a trade union devoted to Section 23, paragraph 2, point a), and the right of trade unions to organize in Section 23, paragraph 4, point b). These rights are compromised when workers cannot have them represented in the workplace in disciplinary and complaint matters, but must be represented by a rival union to which they do not want to join… [21] The arbitrator preferred an interpretation that should not infringe the fundamental rights of MATUSA and its members. Such an interpretation cannot be faulted by a review court.

Since the Court does not have an application for disability under the provisions of the collective agreement, it is not in a position to declare the disability of any of the provisions unenforceable and legally unenforceable. I do not object to the assertion that the arbitrator declared the MOU or its contentious clauses illegal and therefore adopted it in an area for which he is not competent. Their conclusion was simply that the DP cannot be applied to MATUSA and its members. It is trite that no law can restrict a right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Any interpretation different from that taken by the arbitrator in this case would infringe the fundamental rights of MATUSA and its members.